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Abstract  
This paper compares immigrant pupil achievement in the Italian and Spanish school systems. 
Using 2009 PISA data, a stochastic production function is estimated for the whole school 
population of the two countries. In this way, the actual and potential scores in both countries 
are evaluated for sub-samples of students: natives, first-generation, and second-generation 
immigrants. Our results show that the difference between the potential and the actual scores 
for the sub-sample of immigrant students is greater in Italy than in Spain, in private schools 
with respect to public institutions and if the schools are managed nationally.        
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1. Introduction 
 
Like most southern European countries, in the last thirty years Spain and Italy have 
shifted from being primarily emigrant sending to immigrant receiving societies. 
This phenomenon has radically modified the school populations of the two 
countries. In 2000 only 1 per cent of students had an immigration background in 
Italy and less than 2 per cent in Spain, while in 2009 these proportions were 5 per 
cent and 9 per cent respectively. Disentangling these data at the regional level 
shows that both countries are characterized by strong regional divides. In Spain, the 
presence of immigrant students in 2009 was under 5 per cent in Galicia and the 
Basque Country, but it reached 16 per cent in Madrid. Similarly in Italy, a large 
group of southern regions – Calabria, Campania, Puglia, Sardinia and Sicily – 
recorded less than 2 per cent of immigrant pupils, while Emilia Romagna and 
Piedmont go above 10 per cent1.  
Notwithstanding these similarities in terms of school populations, Spain and Italy 
have educational systems that are different in many respects. One of these is the 
degree of decentralization, and in particular the role of regional governments. More 
precisely, the decentralized model adopted in Spain is such that 96 per cent of 
public expenditure on education is managed by regional or local governments, 
while in Italy the proportion managed locally or regionally is only 26 per cent2 of 
the total. Of course, this is the result of a process of public finance decentralization 
that may be considered concluded in Spain but not yet in Italy, and in fact 
decentralization of the school system is an issue still under debate in Italy3. A 
second differentiation between the two school systems is related to the ways of 
financing institutes. The 2009 PISA data set used in this work distinguishes 
between three types of school: public, private government-dependent and private 
independent. In Spain, public schools represent just under 64 per cent of the total, 
private government-dependent schools make up 33 per cent and private 
independents 4 per cent. In Italy, the vast majority of schools are public – 95 per 
cent – while government-dependent private institutes and independent private 
institutes are 3 and 2 per cent of the total respectively. Turning to the performance 
of students, the above-mentioned PISA 2009 provides evidence for a slight 
advantage of Italian students in their average scores on the three tests employed: 
mathematics, reading and sciences (see Table 2 below). Disentangling this 
indicator, one finds that there is a very small difference between native Spanish and 
Italian students and between the groups of first-generation immigrants, while there 
is a big disparity between the two school regimes for second-generation 
immigrants4. We take advantage of these similarities and diversities to estimate a 
stochastic production function for the schools in these two countries. In this way, 
we attempt to answer the question of which school system is more efficient as far 
as immigrant pupil scores are concerned. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows. In section 2, the most recent literature on the performances of education 
systems as regards immigrant pupils is briefly described and the more relevant 
empirical applications to this issue are reviewed. In Section 3, the data and the 
empirical strategy are presented. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 
concludes.   
 
2. Literature on immigrant student gaps in different school regimes.  
 
The study of the achievement of immigrant students in different countries and 
school systems is quite recent but well-established. The topic has been approached 
with both studies on a specific country and in a comparative perspective, and also 
from different points of view, i.e. by focusing on some of the individual student 
characteristics and/or by considering aspects of school system organization. All 
these studies exploit a growing set of data collected at the individual level in 
different surveys, and from empirical methodologies that are becoming ever more 
sophisticated. The empirical methodology chosen for the present work is illustrated 
in Section 3, while here we briefly summarize recent results of empirical analyses 
on this topic in comparative studies and in analysis focusing on Italian and Spanish 
schools. 
 
Generally speaking, in studies of a specific school system, the weight of individual 
characteristics of immigrant students (such as family background, the language 
spoken at home, attitude to study, being a first or second generation immigrant) in 
their scores is tested together with aspects such as grade retention, public vs. 
private financing of schools, the socio-economic profile of classes and schools, the 
segregation of immigrants, or the level of formal comprehensiveness (or 
differentiation) of the curricula. In this framework, the analysis has the aim of 
disentangling the role of individual characteristics from the functioning of the 
school system in the final outcomes of immigrant students. On the contrary, in 
comparative works the research question frequently focuses on only one of these 
aspects, which can be related to the individual characteristics of the students (for 
example, family background) or to the education system (grade retention), with the 
aim of discovering in which scheme immigrant students achieve better.  
 
A common result of studies on single countries is that one of the main reasons for 
lower performances of immigrant students with respect to native students is a less 
favourable family background. This has recently been demonstrated for Germany 
(Ammermuller 2005) and Denmark (Rangvid 2007). Notice that ‘family 
background’ does not necessarily mean the education level of parents or their 
economic condition, but could also be a favourable home environment for learning, 
as indicated by the number of books, the language spoken at home, or the academic 
expectations of parents for their children, etc. After family background, the role of 
the school is crucial in explaining gaps in test scores, both in terms of school 
quality and peer composition (Rangvid 2007).  
 
As underlined by Park and Sandefur (2010) ‘even if detailed analyses of 
educational differences between native and immigrant children in specific countries 
have contributed to our understanding of educational inequality associated with 
immigrant status in the corresponding country’, the question of ‘which countries 
are more successful in facilitating immigrant children’s educational integration is 
better addressed by comparative research across many countries’. In fact, 
comparative studies confirm the relevance of the education level of parents in 
reducing the lag of scores of immigrants, even if this may vary strongly across 
nations. By comparing Europe and the traditional countries of immigration, Entorf 
and Minoiu (2005) show that the highest impact of family education on score is 
found for Germany, the UK and US, whereas intergenerational transmission of 
educational attainment is less likely in Scandinavian countries and in Canada. At 
the same time, they show that for students with a migration background a key for 
catching up with their schoolfellows is the language spoken at home. By focusing 
on second-generation immigrants in thirteen European countries, Dronkers and 
Fleischmann (2010) provide evidence that not only individual student 
characteristics matter in their academic achievement, but also macro-characteristics 
of the country of destination, like the average educational level and the 
naturalisation policy. Again in a comparative framework and looking at the 
organisation of the education system, Park and Sandefur (2010) study the role of 
grade retention in reducing the gap between native and immigrant children in ten 
European countries. They demonstrate that grade retention, where applied, 
broadens the gap between immigrant children and natives. Alegre and Ferrer-
Esteban (2010) compare countries with educational systems controlled publicly, 
and with more comprehensive curricula, with countries with schools that are more 
market-oriented and have differentiated curricula. Their conclusion is that 
segregation is favoured by differentiated curricula and market-oriented systems. 
From our point of view, an interesting work is that of Perelman et al. (2011) on the 
Belgian school system. Although their analysis is focused on one country, the aim 
is to explain the different performances of two communities, the Flemish and the 
French, by considering the efficiency of the two school regimes. 
 
In recent years, the Spanish school system has been studied from many points of 
view. While Fuentes (2009) evaluates the broad performance of the regime, more 
than one work focuses on comparison between the performances of private and 
public schools for the total population of students. More precisely, Mancebon and 
Muniz (2007) and Calero and Escardibul (2007) share the conclusion that 
differences in student scores are not connected to the financing system of the 
schools. Ferrera et al. (2011) compare the performances of regions, taking into 
account the role of local autonomy in the Spanish school system and considering 
the total population. They conclude that lower scores are recorded in those regions 
that are less efficient overall. In a perspective that is very close to the present work, 
Perelman and Satin (2008) measure educational efficiency at student level with a 
parametric stochastic distance function using Spanish PISA 2006 scores. As far as 
our knowledge goes, Zinovyeva et al. (2008) carry out the only study on immigrant 
student achievements in Spain. In particular, they confirm the relevance of 
individual characteristics in explaining more than 50 per cent of the performance 
gap between native and immigrant pupils and they provide evidence that school 
fixed effects explain only 4 to 10 per cent of this gap, capturing mainly differences 
in the average quality of peers' parental educational levels across schools. 
Moreover, they are able to demonstrate that immigrants tend to perform relatively 
worse in those locations where segregation is higher, and they observe that 
immigrants' performance tends to improve the longer they have stayed in Spain, 
especially for those who do not speak Spanish at home. They also find that the 
second generation of immigrant students perform only marginally better than the 
first generation, with the second generation performing as well as native pupils 
only in reading tests. In their opinion, this result suggests that the second generation 
of the immigrants arriving in Spain now will probably only partially close the 
performance gap with native pupils.  
 
The Italian school system has also been studied in many respects5. As for the topic 
of the present paper, Quintano et al. (2009) adopt the same methodology and data 
set to measure efficiency in Italian schools in a broad sense, whereas Turati et al. 
(2011) propose a comparative study between Spain and Italy to evaluate the two 
school regimes for the total population of students. To the best of our knowledge, 
there are no comparative studies of the Spanish and Italian school systems that, 
taking advantage of the similarities of these two countries, compare how efficient 
they are with respect to the sub-sample of immigrant students by using a stochastic 
frontier approach (henceforth SFA). 
 
3. Data and empirical strategy 
 
3.1. PISA dataset  
 
The PISA survey carried out in 2009 uses a sample of 25,887 Spanish students and 
30,905 Italian students, who represent 6.7 per cent and 6.1 per cent of the two 
school populations respectively. The sample is restricted here to those records 
(23,563 Italian and 21,033 Spanish pupils) with no missing data (see Table 1 and 
Table 2).  
[near here Table 1]  
 
[near here Table 2]  
 The empirical strategy of this paper is a two-stage procedure: in the first we 
estimate a stochastic frontier to evaluate the potential scores that pupils in Spanish 
and Italian school systems may achieve, taking into account their characteristics 
and if the regimes are efficient. In the second step we regress the estimated 
efficiency, i.e. the difference between potential and real scores, for sub-samples of 
students with a set of explanatory variables, with the aim of testing the hypothesis 
that different management frameworks (centralized vs. decentralized, public vs. 
private) perform differently with regard to the specific group of immigrant students.  
 
3.2. The Stochastic frontier 
The stochastic function approach is well known6, as is the application of the 
methodology to the education process7. In comparison with the alternative frontier 
approach, i.e. Data Envelopment Analysis (henceforth DEA), SFA allows us to 
measure how much of the distance between each student’s practice and the best 
practice is attributable to ‘unexplained’ factors, and how much of this distance can 
be assigned to inefficiency in the educational production process.  
 
The vast majority of studies of the education production function do not consider 
the role of the efficiency component, while the SFA allows us to take into account 
the fact that education is a process in which students use their own and school 
inputs and transform them into academic results, subject to inefficient behaviours 
that can be identified at the student level. In a technical efficiency framework, the 
production function indicates the maximum attainable output, given specific inputs. 
Any lower performances can be traced back to random noise – beyond the 
individual’s control – as well as inefficiency. In order to tackle the inefficiency 
issue in education, many empirical studies use the previously-mentioned 
deterministic non-parametric DEA, in line with the pioneering contribution by 
Charnes et al. (1981). However, parametric stochastic distance functions allow us 
to deal simultaneously with multiple outputs, e.g. mathematics and reading test 
scores, and multiple inputs, including school inputs, student background and peer-
group characteristics, in a stochastic framework.  
 
The SFA (Aigner et al. 1977; Meeusen and Van De Broeck 1977) is widely used to 
estimate individual efficiency scores, while in empirical analyses student results are 
typically aggregated at school or district level, imposing a considerable limit on the 
ability to disentangle the effect of a student’s own background from his/her peer-
group and school inputs on student achievement.  
 
The basic idea of this methodology lies in the introduction of an additive error term 
to disentangle random noise from an inefficiency term. More precisely, the 
interpretation we can give to the error terms in the case of student performance is 
the following:  on the one hand, the stochastic term ui is expected to capture 
unobserved student characteristics – mainly innate abilities, but also aptitude 
regarding performance in tests and luck, as well as family-specific circumstances 
(e.g. parents’ workplace status or family problems at home potentially affecting a 
student’s results but not captured by the model). All of these characteristics are 
assumed to be distributed normally at random in the population. On the other hand, 
the distance function term vi is expected to capture students’ and teachers’ efforts 
and motivation, as well as school performance and organization, which are not 
explained by input endowments and the role of educational institutions. These are 
considered important explanatory factors of international differences observed in 
student achievement, particularly in the case in which institutions favour 
homogeneity in classroom composition. 
Different distributions have been proposed for the inefficiency term, such as normal 
mean distribution, exponential distribution, normal truncated distribution and 
Gamma distribution. There is no a priori reason to prefer any specific type of 
distribution of errors and most often the assumption of a half-normal distributed 
inefficiency term is applied. Some studies have considered parametric 
methodologies, mainly using Cobb-Douglas specifications, but also the translog 
functional form proposed by Christensen et al. (1971) has been employed. The 
main advantage of the translog function, which is adopted here, is its highly 
flexible nature, which allows the study of interactions in the production process.  
 
More precisely, in this paper the translog production function estimated is the 
following:   
 
 
 
where i=1…n is the number of students and j=1…m is the number of schools. The 
term u is the normal error term representing pure randomness, and v is the non-
negative error term representing inefficiency. The one-sided error in the stochastic 
frontier efficiency model is assumed to be half-normal.  
 
The dependent variable (scoreij ) is the output, which here is the average of the 
score obtained in each of the three tests: reading, mathematics and science. All the 
explanatory variables are expressed as the log of the difference between the 
distance from the value to the mean of the variable, as the estimation of a translog 
function requires. The first explanatory variable is the index of the economic, social 
and cultural condition of the family of each student, ESCS in the PISA dataset 
(ESCSij). This index is in fact calculated directly from PISA as a weighted average 
of an index related to home possession by the family, the highest parental level of 
education and the highest parental occupational status. In the stochastic frontier 
estimation presented here, the same index is used in two different ways: at the child 
level (ESCSij) and calculated at the school level (ESCSj) (see Table 1 and Table 3 
below).  
The second explanatory variable used here is the index of the school’s educational 
resources, calculated from PISA on the basis of seven items related to the 
principal’s perceptions of potential factors hindering instruction at the school, i.e. 
SMATEDU in the PISA dataset (SMATEDUj). The last variable in the estimation of 
the stochastic frontier is the number of hours of maths in a week, calculated as an 
average per school (mathweekj)8.  
 
[near here Table 3]  
 
3.3. The gap in efficiency  
 In the second step, the variables employed in explaining the difference between the 
potential and the actual scores of natives and immigrants are the following: student 
gender, the language spoken at home, a dummy for students who have repeated one 
or more years in their school carrier, the highest parental educational level 
(HISCED), the highest parental occupational status (HISEI), and the generation of 
immigration, i.e. if the pupil is classified as native or as a first- or second-
generation immigrant (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). In addition, some 
school features are considered: the size of the school in terms of students enrolled, 
the student-teacher ratio, a proxy for the level of management decentralisation of 
the school and the three ways of financing previously mentioned: public, private 
government-dependent and private independent.  
 
As a proxy for the level of decentralization of the management of schools, the PISA 
dataset has more than one option. Two indices are directly calculated, RESPRES 
and RESPCURR. In particular, school principals were asked to report whether 
“principals”, “teachers”, the “school governing board”, the “regional or local 
education authority”, or the “national education authority” has considerable 
responsibility for several tasks. School responsibility for resource allocation index 
(RESPRES) was derived from six items, like selecting teachers for hire or 
establishing teachers’;  starting salaries. The school responsibility for curriculum 
and assessment index (RESPCURR) was derived from items like choosing which 
textbooks to use or deciding which courses are offered. Higher values on these 
indexes should indicate relatively more responsibility for schools than for the local, 
regional or national education authority9. As Table 3 shows, the fact that RESPRES 
and RESPCURR are the result of a multiple-choice question for which school 
principals may click more than one answer has the consequence that they seem not 
to be representative of the real level of school system decentralization. For this 
reason we decided to use the answer to only one question, which is that on the 
authority responsible for hiring teachers, to make a dummy, which is 1 if the 
respondent ticked “national government” for the following question: “regarding 
your school, who has considerable responsibility for selecting teachers for hire?”, 
and zero otherwise. As Table 3 shows, in Italian public schools 47 per cent of 
students are enrolled in institutions that we have classified as nationally managed 
schools, while in Spain this percentage is only 15 per cent.  
 
Finally, notice that in this paper the focus is not on the gap between the scores of 
natives and those of the immigrant pupils, as in the majority of studies on this topic. 
What the stochastic frontier allows us to quantify is the score potential of different 
groups of students and the difference between the potential and the actual scores in 
each country. On the basis of this estimated difference we study which variables 
may explain it.   
 
4. Results  
 
As expected, and as illustrated in Table 4, the stochastic frontier of the average 
score is positively and significantly explained by the index of the economic, social 
and cultural index of the student’s family and that of the school; the coefficient on 
the quality of resources of the school and the hours of maths are positive but not 
significant if the log is considered, while both variables are significant and the 
coefficients are positive if the square of the log is taken into account. Notice that 
the dummy indicating the country of the pupils is not significant in the estimation 
illustrated in Table 4, where the whole population of the two countries is 
considered10. 
                                                    [near here Table 4] 
 
The estimation of the frontier enables us to calculate the potential score, the 
difference between the real score and the potential and an indicator of efficiency for 
each sub-sample of the school population in the two countries (Table 5).  
 
[near here Table 5] 
 
Starting from this information, one may observe that the two systems are very close 
in terms of their total efficiency, which approximates to 82 per cent for both 
countries11, and also for the group of first-generation immigrant pupils, for whom 
the total efficiency in both countries is about 76 per cent, while a big disparity 
exists for second-generation immigrant students. For the latter group, the difference 
between Italy and Spain in terms of mean score is about 32 points (481-449) in 
favour of Italy. This result is confirmed if one looks at the difference between the 
two potential scores, which is reduced to 25 points (565-540), still in favour of the 
Italian sub-group, or efficiency, for which the gap is about 3 per cent (80-77). 
 
Other interesting findings regard school financing and management structures. As 
for the former, the best performances are those of native students enrolled in private 
schools in Spain, with a slight advantage for independent schools compared to 
government-dependent schools, followed by Italian native pupils in public schools. 
As for immigrant students and considering the small group of second-generation 
immigrants, the best performance is that of private government-dependent schools 
in Spain, followed by public schools in Italy. The group of first-generation 
immigrant pupils seems to be favoured in closing the gap if they are in private 
independent schools in Spain or in public schools in Italy.  
 
Considering management, for native students it seems that decentralized 
management of schools obtains the best results in both Spain and Italy, while 
second-generation immigrants seem to reach the best results in centralized schools 
in Italy and in decentralized institutes in Spain. As for first-generation immigrant 
students, a centralized regime seems to perform better in Italy, but the contrary is 
true in Spain. 
 
In more depth, Table 6 shows the results of the OLS estimation of the difference 
between the real and potential scores for the sub-sample of first- and second-
generation immigrants12. 
First of all, notice that the dummy for country in this model is positive and 
statistically significant. This means that if the sub-sample of immigrant students is 
considered, the difference between their potential and actual scores is greater in 
Italy than in Spain. Moreover, even though the OLS estimation verifies that student 
features (such as the language spoken at home, the education level of the parents 
and being a first- or second-generation immigrant) are relevant in explaining this 
difference, there are important school features that also matter. In particular, the 
difference between potential and actual scores seems to be larger in private schools 
and if the school is nationally managed, while a greater student-teacher ratio seems 
to reduce this difference.        
  
[near here Table 6 ]  
 
5. Conclusions  
 
By exploiting the PISA dataset and by estimating a stochastic frontier, the Spanish 
and Italian school regimes have been compared with the aim of evaluating their 
performances with respect to a specific sub-sample of pupils, i.e. immigrant 
students. At a first look, the data show that the performances of the two countries, 
both in terms of scores and efficiency, are very close if the whole school population 
is considered, and also for the sub-samples of native students and first-generation 
immigrant pupils, while a big disparity exists for second-generation immigrant 
students. Analysis of actual and potential scores for sub-samples of students and 
different ways of financing and managing schools does not give clear results. A 
more precise result comes from analysis of the determinants of the difference 
between potential and real scores for the sub-sample of first- and second-generation 
immigrants. In particular, our estimation shows not only that the two countries 
perform differently, but that this difference is greater in private schools and if the 
school is nationally managed.        
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics - students and parents 
Obs Perc. Obs Perc. 
Girls 11805 50,10 10571 50,26
Boys 11758 49,90 10462 49,74
Native students 22453 95,29 19218 91,37
First-generation immigrant students 862 3,66 1582 7,52
Second-generation immigrant students 248 1,05 233 1,11
Pupils who repeat one or more years 3046 12,93 6260 29,76
Students for whom the language of the test is that spoken at home 19141 81,23 18002 85,59
Students for whom the language of the test is not that spoken at home 4422 18,77 3031 14,41
Highest educational level of the parents (HISCED index) 4,11 4,26
Highest parental occupational status (HISEI index) 47,61 46,42
Index of economic, social and cultural status (ESCS index) -0,05 -0,24
Total number of students 23563 21033
Italy Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics – scores 
 
Italy Spain 
Score for the three tests 502,19 494,63 
Score_read 501,26 490,62 
Score_math 499,16 496,13 
Score_science 506,15 497,15 
 
  
 
Table 3.  Descriptive statistics – Schools 
 
Italy Spain 
Hours of maths in the week (average per school) 3,62 3,57
Student-teacher ratio 9,23 11,31
No. of students enrolled in each school (average) 680,76 695,17
Number of student enrolled in  public schools 22447 13134
Perc. of student enrolled in public schools  95,26 62,44
No. of students enrolled in private government-dependent  schools 701 7104
Perc. of student enrolled in private gov-dependent schools  2,98 33,78
No. of students enrolled in  private independent schools 415 795
Perc.of student enrolled in private independent schools 1,76 3,78
Index of economic, social and cultural status at the school level (ESCS) -0,134 -0,187
Index of the quality of the resources of the school (SMATEDU) 0,002 0,013
Index of responsability for curriculum (RESPCURR) - total 0,140 -0,450
RESPCURR in public schools 0,140 -0,670
RESPCURR in private government-dependent  schools -0,180 -0,080
RESPCURR in private independent  schools 0,450 -0,150
Index of resposability for resources (RESPRES) -0,680 -0,450
RESPRES in public schools -0,750 -0,740
RESPRES in private government-dependent  schools 0,360 0,040
RESPRES in private independent  schools 1,140 0,140
Dummy for national responsibility for hiring teachers in public schools (in perc.) 46,666 14,682
Dummy for national responsibility for hiring teachers in private government-dependent  schools  (in perc.) 0,537 1,147
Dummy for national responsibility for hiring teachers in private independent  schools  (in perc.) 0,000 0,000
 
  
Table 4. Stochastic frontier (whole population)1 
(dependent variable Log of the score of the three tests) 
 
 
Index of Economic Social and cultural Status(ESCS) 0.399**
(-8.429)
ESCS index for the school 0.184**
(-5.486)
Index of quality of resources of the school 0.045
(-1.844)
Hours of maths per week(school average) 0.017
(0.838)
Square of the ESCS index -0.108**
(-3.607)
Square of the ESCS index for the school -0.037
(-1.385)
Square of the index of the quality of school resources 0.043**
(-4.301)
Square of the hours of math per week 0.015**
(-3.641)
Product of the ESCS index 0.030
(-1.471)
Product of the ESCS and the quality of school resources indices -0.024
(-1.686)
Product of the ESCS index and maths hours per week -0.014
(-1.086)
Product of the ESCS for the school school and quality of school resources indices -0.051**
(-3.694)
Product of the ESCS for the school and maths hours per week 0.006
(0.549)
Product of quality of school resources and maths hours per week 0.016
(-1.827)
ITA 0.001
(0.353)
Constant 5.651**
(-129.121)
Observations 44596
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
(1) All variables are expressed as the log of the difference between the diffence of the variable and 
and the mean and the minimum of the same variable 
 
 Table 5. Mean score,  potential, difference and efficiency for sub-samples of 
students and type of schools 
Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain 
Total Population 502,19 494,63 580,94 572,84 78,75 78,20 0,8277 0,8258
Native 504,76 500,07 582,75 576,59 77,99 76,52 0,8300 0,8319
Second -generation of immigrants 481,04 448,71 565,02 540,04 83,98 91,33 0,8080 0,7762
First -generation of immigrants 441,38 435,42 538,28 532,07 96,90 96,65 0,7584 0,7583
Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain 
Public schools
Native 505,69 489,38 583,10 565,46 77,41 76,08 0,8322 0,8276
Second-generation immigrants 483,96 433,91 567,20 528,39 83,25 94,49 0,8113 0,7626
First-generation immigrants 445,64 431,23 541,32 527,53 95,67 96,30 0,7637 0,7566
Private government-dependent schools
Native 483,07 515,33 564,91 592,41 81,84 77,08 0,8143 0,8383
Second-generation immigrants 432,38 494,54 523,47 574,20 91,09 79,66 0,7713 0,8219
First-generation immigrants 386,58 447,83 499,16 545,62 112,58 97,79 0,6899 0,7630
Private independent schools
Native 488,66 530,70 591,57 609,20 102,91 78,50 0.7750 0,8425
Second-generation immigrants 509,68 503,48 624,55 599,08 114,87 95,59 0,7740 0,7952
First-generation immigrants 462,53 460,06 553,42 557,41 90,89 97,35 0,7885 0,7751
Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain 
Schools managed by central authority 
Native 503,64 467,13 582,28 547,86 78,64 80,73 0,8288 0,8040
Second-generation immigrants 485,35 396,48 568,11 499,33 82,75 102,85 0,8131 0,7199
First-generation immigrants 447,16 416,35 542,09 518,02 94,93 101,67 0,7664 0,7307
Schools not managed by central authority 
Native 506,36 503,64 583,42 579,70 77,06 76,07 0,8332 0,8340
Second-generation immigrants 473,86 469,79 559,88 556,48 86,02 86,69 0,8010 0,7980
First-generation immigrants 434,18 437,21 533,53 533,39 99,35 96,18 0,7485 0,7609
Mean score Potential score Difference Efficiency
Total student population 
Mean score Potential score Difference Efficiency
Funding system 
Mean score Potential score Difference Efficiency
Decentralized vs. centralized institutions
 
 Table 6. Determinants of efficiency for First- and Second-Generation Immigrants 
(OLS, dep. var. difference between the potential score and the score for this sub-sample ) 
 
Dummy for gender of the student (1 girl, 0 boy) 0.657
(0.569)
Dummy if the language of the test is that spoken at home (1 yes, 0 no) -2.400*
(-1.968)
Highest educational level of parents 2.840**
(-7.953)
Highest parental occupational status 0.063
(-1.472)
Immigration status 7.527**
(-4.651)
Dummy for student who repeats one or more years 25.237**
(-20.375)
Total school enrolment 0.000
(0.137)
School Type (1=public, 2=private gov. depend, 3=private indep.) 5.845**
(-3.332)
Student-Teacher ratio -0.640**
(-2.885)
Dummy school national management (1 national hiring teachers, 0 otherwise) 3.266*
(-2.149)
Dummy for the country (1 Italy, 0 Spain) 4.210**
(-2.838)
Constant 46.770**
(-8.060)
Observations 2925
R-squared 0.150
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
 
 
  
 
                                                            
Notes 
 
1 PISA 2009 
2 2011 OECD data. 
3 Regarding this topic, see, among many others Brugnano (2011) and Ferrari and Zanardi (2012).  
4 Native students are those who were born in the country where they were assessed by PISA or who 
had at least one parent born in the country. Students with an immigration background include 
students who are first-generation immigrants, i.e. foreign-born students whose parents are also 
foreign-born, or second-generation immigrants, i.e. students who were born in the country of 
assessment but whose parents are foreign-born.  
5 Among many others Checchi and Flabbi (2007) and Checchi and Peragine (2005)  
6 See Battese and Corra (1977) and Battese and Coelli (1995) 
7 Barrow (1991) and  Cooper et al. (1997) 
8 The choice of variables follows a paper by Perelman et al. (2011) in which the same methodological 
framework is applied, even though the research question is quite different..   
9 PISA 2009 
10  Two stochastic frontiers, one for each sub-sample of Italian and Spanish pupils, have been 
estimated. Additional information on these estimations is available upon request.   
11  This is the reason why the dummy for the country is not significant in the stochastic frontier 
estimation (Table 4).   
12 An analysis of the determinants of the difference in efficiency for the whole population of students 
is available on request.  
 
 
 
References 
 
Aigner, D., C.A K. Lovell and P. Schmidt. 1977. Formulation and estimation of 
stochastic frontier production function models. Journal of Econometrics 6: 21-37. 
 
Alegre, M.A., and G. Ferrer-Esteban. 2010. How Do School Regimes Tackle 
Ethnic Segregation: Some Insights Su:orted in Pisa 2006. Quality and Inequality 
in Education ed. Dronkers J. 
 
Ammermüller, A. 2005. Poor Background or Low Returns? Why Immigrant 
Students in Germany Perform so Poorly in PISA, IZA DP  Discussion Paper No. 
05-18. 
 
Barrow, M., M. 1991. Measuring local education authority performance: A 
frontier a:roach. Economics of Education Review 10: 19–27. 
 
Battese, G., and T. Coelli. 1995. A model for technical inefficiency effects in a 
stochastic frontier production function for panel data. Empirical Economics 20: 
325-332.  
 
Battese, G., and G. Corra. 1977. Estimation of a production frontier model: with 
a:lication to a pastoral zone of eastern Australia. Australian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics  21: 169-179. 
 
Brugnano, C. 2011. Federalismo fiscale ed efficienza della spesa regionale. Il caso 
della spesa per l'istruzione, Ph.D Thesis 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
Calero, J., and J.O. Escardibul. 2007. Evaluacion de servicios educativos: el 
rendimento en los centros publicos y privados medido en PISA -2003. Revista de 
Economia Pubblica 183: 33-66  
 
Charnes, A., W.W. Cooper and E. Rhodes. 1981. Evaluating program and 
managerial efficiency: an a:lication of data envelopment analysis to Program 
Follow Through.  Management Science 27: 668-697. 
 
Checchi, D., and L. Flabbi. 2007. Intergenerational Mobility and Schooling 
Decisions in Germany and Italy: The Impact of Secondary School Tracks. IZA DP 
2876. 
 
Checchi, D., and V. Peragine. 2005. Regional Disparities and Inequality of 
O:ortunity: The Case of Italy.  IZA DP 1874. 
 
Christensen, L., D. Jorgenson and L. Lau. 1971. Conjugate duality and the 
transcendental logarithmic production function. Econometrica 39: 255–256. 
 
Ferrera, J.M., E. Cebada, F. Chaparro, and D. Gonzales. 2010. Exploring 
education efficiency divergences across Spanish regions in PISA 2006. Revista de 
Economia Aplicada 1-30.  
 
Dronkers, J., and F. Fleischmann. 2010. The Educational Attainment of Second 
Generation Immigrants from Different Countries of Origin in the EU Member-
States. Quality and Inequality in Education ed.  Dronkers J. London New York: 
Springer.  
 
Entorf, H., and N. Minoiu. 2005.  What a Difference Immigration Policy Makes: 
A Comparison of PISA Scores in Europe and Traditional Countries of 
Immigration. German Economic Review 6: 355–376. 
Ferrari, I., and A. Zanardi. 2012. Decentralisation and interregional redistribution 
in the Italian education system. Education Economics forthcoming. 
Fuentes, A. 2009. Raising Education Outcomes in Spain. OECD Economics 
Department WP 666   
 
Gang, I.N., and K.F. Zimmermann. 2000. Is child like parent? Educational 
attainment and ethnic origin. Journal of Human Resources 35: 550–569. 
 
Mancebon, M.J., and M.A. Muniz. 2008. Private versus public high schools in 
Spain: disentangling managerial and programme efficiencies. Journal of the 
Operational Research Society 59: 892–901. 
 
Meusen, W., and J. Van Der Broeck. 1977. Efficiency estimating from Cobb-
Douglas production functions with composed error. International Economic 
Review 18: 435-444. 
 
Park, H., and G. Sandefur. 2010. Educational Gaps Between Immigrant and Native 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Students in Europe: The Role of Grade. Quality and Inequality in Education ed. 
Dronkers J. London New York: Springer.  
 
 
Perelman, S., P. Pestieau and D.Santin. 2011. Why is the performance of Flemish 
and French speaking students so different? A stochastic frontier approach. 
Educational divergence – why do pupils do better in Flanders than in the French 
community?  Re-Bel e-book 8/2011. 
 
Perelman, S., and D. Santin. 2011. Measuring educational efficiency at student 
level with parametric stochastic distance functions: an application to Spanish 
PISA results. Education Economics  19: 29-49. 
 
Quintano, C., R. Castellano and S. Longobardi. 2009. L'influenza dei fattori socio 
economici sulle competenze degli studenti italiani. Un'analisi multilevel dei dati 
PISA 2006.  Rivista di economia e statistica del territorio 2: 109-149.  
 
Rangvid, B.S. 2007. Sources of Immigrants’ Underachievement: Results from 
PISA-Copenhagen.  Education Economics 15: 293-326. 
 
Schnepf, S.V. 2007. How Different Are Immigrants? Cross-Country and Cross-
Survey Analysis of Educational Achievement. Journal of Population Economics 
20: 527–545.  
 
Turati, G., D. Montolio and M. Piacenza. 2011. Fiscal Decentralisation, Private 
School Funding, and Students’ Achievements. A Tale From Two Roman Catholic 
Countries. IEB WP 2011/44.  
 
Zinovyeva, N., F. Felgueroso and P. Vazquez. 2008. Immigration and Students’ 
Achievement in Spain: Evidence from PISA. Documento de Trabaco Fedea 2008-
37 
 
